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I. OVERVIEW OF ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 
What most defines access to health care in the United States may be its stark inequity. Daily 
headlines in top newspapers paint the highs and lows. Articles entitled: “We Mapped the 
Uninsured. You’ll notice a Pattern: They tend to live in the South, and they tend to be poor”1 
and op-eds with titles like “Do Poor People Have a Right to Health Care?”2 and “What it’s Like 
to Be Black and Pregnant when you Know How Dangerous That Can Be”3 run side-by-side with 
headlines touting “The Operating Room of the Future,”4 and advances in gene therapy that 
promise cures to everything form vision loss to cancer, accompanied by high six-figure price 
tags.5 Americans’ claims that they have access to the best medical care in the world are correct. 
Equally true are the claims that the system is broken.  
This chapter maps out the complex picture of access to medical care in the United States 
and reflects on how variable access illustrates, among other things, an American ambivalence 
about health solidarity. This Chapter first considers health care financing as one critical element 
that defines access to medical care and describes the multifaceted U.S. health care financing 
structure, predominated by public insurance programs for select populations and regulated 
private insurance for others. Second, this Chapter describes how access is equally shaped by 
legal requirements that create treatment obligations for doctors or hospitals, regardless of how 
someone pays for care. There is no constitutional right to health in the U.S., but various layers 
of statutory and common law have created some guarantees. That said, despite efforts to 
 
1 Quoctrung Bui & Margot Sanger-Katz, We mapped the Uninsured. You’ll Notice a Pattern, NY TIMES (Oct. 30, 
2015).  
2 The Editorial Board, Do Poor People Have a Right to Health Care? NY TIMES EDITORIAL (July 7, 2018). 
3 Dani McClain, What It’s Like to Be Black and Pregnant When You Know How Dangerous That Can Be, The 
Nation (March 6, 2017). See also Linda Villarosa, Why America’s Black Mothers and Babies Are in a Life-or-Death 
Crisis, NY Times (April 11, 2018).  
4 Laura Landro, The Operating Room of the Future, WALL STREET J. (May 28, 2018).  
5 Peter Loftus, Drug Firm Spark Therapeutics Will Charge $850,000 for Vision-Loss Gene Therapy, WALL STREET J. 
(Jan 3, 2018).  
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increase access over the past decades, the United States is still extraordinary, as compared to 
peer nations, on the unevenness of access to medical care among its population.  
Even after the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 (ACA), 
nearly 10 percent of the total population remains uninsured and, in many cases, lacks access to 
basic medical care.6 Even many people with insurance struggle to pay the cost-sharing 
necessary to use medical care. And some cannot get access to doctors, whether insured or not. 
Despite legal obligations, providers still enjoy considerable autonomy over whom they care for 
and when. And most laws that create treatment obligations are silent about who will pay for 
that care, possibly leaving patients who receive lifesaving care with crippling medical debt.  
Scholars attribute the perpetuation of this uneven picture to a range of factors: organized 
medicine and other interest groups’ resistance to public insurance, broader ideological 
skepticism of government or of new taxes, path dependency and inertia.7 At its root, disparities 
in access draw from the fact that the notion of a right to health care does not have and never 
has had the same salience in the United States as in its peer nations. In turn, the existing system 
undermines health solidarity by reproducing a norm where access to health care is not 
universal. Even though U.S. laws have facilitated or guaranteed access to care for some people 
and in some circumstances, the absence of consensus on any coherent guiding principle is 
evident in the remaining gaps. 
II. FINANCING AND HEALTH INSURANCE AS POINT OF ENTRY 
The U.S. spends more on medical care than on any other single good or service. In 2017, 
U.S. medical care spending accounted for nearly 18% of the gross domestic product and $3.5 
trillion in total spending.8 Relative to its wealth, the U.S. spends well more than other OECD 
nations—twice as much as a comparable country average and 25 percent more than its closest 
peer nation, Switzerland.9 Yet, most of these other countries outperform the U.S. on key health 
 
6United States Census, Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2017 5 (2018), at  
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/demo/p60-264.pdf (last accessed July 
30, 2019). 
7 See Timothy Jost, Access to Health Insurance and Health Benefits in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW (I. 
Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman, and William M. Sage, eds. 2017).  
8 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, NHE Fact Sheet Historical NHE 2017, at 
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-
reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html. 
9 Bradley Sawyer and Cynthia Cox, Peterson-Kaiser Health System Tracker, How Does Health Spending in the 
U.S. Compare to Other Countries? (2018), at https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-
spending-u-s-compare-countries/#item-start.  
Draft in Progress 
3 
 
 
 
 
outcomes, including life expectancy and infant mortality, as well as subjective patient 
experience. 10   
A major part of the problem in the U.S. is outsized prices that impede affordability, and thus 
access. Although utilization in the U.S. is generally not more than elsewhere, prices for medical 
services and goods in the U.S. are many time those in peer nations.11 For the most part, the U.S. 
has no central, regulatory price controls.12 Each insurance program, public and private, must 
separately negotiate rates with every provider. And the largest public insurance program, 
Medicare, has statutory restrictions that prevent the government from regulating prices on 
prescription drugs. The U.S. strategy has been to look to the market and competition to check 
prices, but this strategy has not worked well.13   
Another part of the problem can be explained by how people access, and do not access, 
medical care in the U.S. A century ago, people who needed medical care simply paid for it. After 
a century of medical advances and the growth of a medical industry of hospitals, drugs, and 
devices, medical care had become so expensive, very few people could afford to pay for it out-
of-pocket. For most people, having good health insurance has become a necessary gateway to 
accessing good medical care,14 and for many doctors and hospitals, it is the key to being paid.  
For most Americans, the first request when they go to a doctor or hospital is for their 
insurance card. In fact, some hospitals will not admit someone for care without proof they can 
pay. The average price of normal childbirth in the U.S. is over $10,000 and coronary bypass 
surgery costs on average over $78,000.15 The annual per person spending on medical care is 
over $10,000.16 Compare this amount to the median household income, which before taxes 
 
10 Eric C. Schneider et al., The Commonwealth Fund, Mirror, Mirror 2017: International Comparison Reflects 
Flaws and Opportunities for Better U.S. Health Care 8-9 (2017). Marian F. MacDorman et al., Is the United States 
Maternal Mortality Rate Increasing? Disentangling Trends from Measurement Issues, 128 OBSTAT. GYNECOL. 447, 
453 (2016).  
11 Gerald F. Anderson et al., It’s Still The Prices, Stupid: Why The US Spends So Much on Health Care, And a 
Tribute to Uwe Reinhardt, 38 HEALTH AFF. 87 (2019). 
12 Some states, like Maryland, have experimented with price controls.  
13 Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care’s Market Bureaucracy, 66 UCLA L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019). 
14 John A. Nyman, The Value of Health Insurance: The Access Motive, 18 J. HEALTH ECON 141 (1999).  
15 Sarah Kliff and Soo Oh, America’s Health Care Prices are Out of Control. These 11 Charts Prove it, VOX (2018), 
at https://www.vox.com/a/health-prices (last accessed July 25, 2018). 
16 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, NHE Fact Sheet Historical NHE 2017, at 
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-
reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html (last accessed July 30, 2019). 
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was $57,652 in 2017.17 The lowest quartile of earners had a mean income of just over $13,000 
and the second quartile of just over $35,000.18 For this majority of Americans, paying for 
medical care out-of-pocket is not an option. This Part will thus primarily focus on how 
insurance—public and private—defines access to care. 
Section A briefly describes what people without health insurance do to pay for care. Section 
B offers an overview of private and public insurance as a primary gateway to access medical 
care, including how it developed, how it evolved with the passage of the ACA, and how it has 
continued to evolve after the ACA’s passage. Section C explains how the heterogeneity in health 
insurance in the United States exacerbates inequitable access, even among the insured. The 
final Section C.2 considers why this inequitable picture remains and whether it will persist in 
the future.  
A. The Uninsured and Access to Medical Care 
Even with the primacy of health insurance, there are a few other ways that people can 
access care without health insurance to pay for it. First, some people receive charity care 
through free clinics, volunteer services offered by providers, fee waivers from hospitals’ charity 
care programs, or drug assistance programs. All of these types of charity care, however, are 
contingent and extremely limited in scope.  
Second, for select populations and some low-income patients, the government provides 
care directly, such as through the Indian Health Service (IHS) for over 2.5 million federally-
recognized American Indians and Alaska Natives,19 Veterans Health Administration (VHA) for 
over 9 million people who served for a designated period of time in the active military, naval or 
air service and were not dishonorably discharged,20 and through federally-qualified community 
health centers (FQHC). The IHS and VHA provide a full range of free or highly-subsidized 
inpatient and outpatient health care services in designated facilities. The VHA has, for example, 
170 medical centers and over 1000 outpatient sites.21 FQHCs, in contrast, are federally-funded 
safety nets that offer mostly outpatient care on a sliding scale basis.  
 
17 United States Census Bureau Quick facts, at https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217 
(last accessed July 25, 2018). 
18 United States Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables: Households, Table H-3 Mean Income Received by 
Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent, at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-
poverty/historical-income-households.html (last accessed July 30, 2019). 
19 IHS Profile, Indian Health Services, at https://www.ihs.gov/newsroom/factsheets/ihsprofile/   
20 About VHS, Veterans Health Administration, at https://www.va.gov/health/aboutvha.asp. 
21 Id.  
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Public provision of care used to be more common in the U.S. In the early 20th Century, a 
majority of hospitals were operated by state or local governments. But public provision has 
receded due in part to a constellation of political interests.22 The very term “socialized 
medicine” has been coopted in the U.S. as the rallying cry to reduce or contain the 
government’s role in the provision of medical care even in areas where the government is 
already involved, such as the regulation of private insurance.  
Third and finally, in some cases, people can and still do pay for care out-of-pocket. They do 
so in a variety of circumstance, ranging from people with financial resources paying for elective 
or concierge care to people without, or with poor, insurance coverage patching together 
funding for care in any way possible.  
B. Map of Public and Private Financing 
The U.S. health insurance system is a convoluted map of different sources of public and 
private health care financing. Unlike in most other countries, the public system in the U.S. is 
neither universally available nor primary. The maze of coverage sources is confusing even for 
students of the U.S. System, as evinced by the fact that it will take several pages just to describe 
its basics.  
1. The Evolution of a Fragmented System 
Although all countries have a mix of public and private financing for health care, the U.S. is 
the only nation among its peers that lacks a universal public system to create access to basic 
care and, not surprisingly, the only one among peers that tolerates high rates of uninsurance.23 
Most other peer nations finance care with universal social insurance through taxes (either 
earmarked or general revenue), such as in France, Canada, or Australia. Alternately, some 
provide care directly through government-owned hospitals and employed physicians, as in the 
UK’s socialized medical systems. The U.S. does neither of these things.  
Even the countries that on first blush might look more like the U.S. system because of the 
centrality of the private market and options, such as Switzerland, are fundamentally different. 
After the passage of the ACA with its mandate that most people have health insurance and its 
creation of regulated marketplaces for purchase, many people attempted to analogize the U.S. 
system to the Swiss one.  
 
22 Jost, supra note 7, at 7.  
23 Even in Switzerland, where people buy insurance from private insurance companies, the uninsurance rate is 
usually only 1-2 percent. If you google, “uninsurance rate Switzerland,” in fact, Google reports back on the 
unemployment rate.  
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The Swiss system is similar only to the extent that each person in Switzerland must 
purchase a health insurance policy directly from an insurer and each person has a choice among 
dozens of insurers.24 Beyond that, the two diverge. The Swiss government mandates basic 
benefits for all plans, sets physician rates through a national fee schedules and maximum 
pricing for hospitals and pharmaceuticals, and approves the community-rated insurance 
premiums.25 The U.S. does regulate benefits in the exchange plans but does not regulate fees 
or approve premiums. Unlike in the U.S., Swiss insurers are all not-for-profit organizations that 
must return surplus to policyholders.26 Coverage is highly subsidized and nearly universal, 
guaranteed by a strongly-enforced mandate that, in a very unamerican way, garnishes wages 
up to the amount of premiums if someone does not have insurance. Access to care does not 
vary significantly, except with respect to what are considered “amenities,” like single-room 
occupancy in hospitals, or services like dental care.27 The Swiss system is in effect a social 
insurance program, just with an element of choice built in. The Dutch and German systems, 
which also offer some choice of health plan, are also social insurance.28 The U.S. system, even if 
it shares some surface characteristics like choice of private insurance plans in a marketplace, is 
fundamentally different in critical philosophical and practical ways. 
At the time that other countries were developing social insurance systems, the U.S. faltered. 
Despite repeated attempts over the twentieth century to create a national system for 
healthcare financing in the U.S., none succeeded and different forms of health care financing 
developed incrementally and over time.29 Over the course of the 20th century, public insurance 
programs were created to pay for care for populations considered especially vulnerable and 
private insurance filled in from there.  
President Lyndon Johnson signed the bedrock programs of public financing, Medicare and 
Medicaid, into law in 1965 as part of his Great Society, and the programs have since been 
 
24 Nikola Biller-Andorno  & Thomas Zeltner, Individual Responsibility and Community Solidarity—The Swiss 
Health Care System, 373 NEW ENG .J. MED. 2193, 2195 (2015). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 2195.  
27 2196. 
28 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Experience of Switzerland the Netherlands with Individual Health Insurance 
Mandates: A model for the United States?, at 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Faculty/Jost%20The%20Experience%20of%20Switzerland%20and%20the%20Net
herlands.pdf (last accessed May 22, 2018). 
29 See, e.g., STUART ALTMAN & DAVID SCHACTMAN, POWER, POLITICS, AND UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE: THE INSIDE STORY OF A 
CENTURY-LONG BATTLE (2011), DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A. MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER: HEALTH AND POLITICS IN THE 
OVAL OFFICE (2009); PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE OVER HEALTH CARE REFORM (2011). 
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considered the greatest success of 20th Century U.S. health reform.30 Even so, Medicare and 
Medicaid were a failed attempt at universalism.31 They set out to pay for healthcare for the 
elderly, the “deserving poor,”—focusing on those who are young or pregnant—and for people 
with disabilities. In other words, Medicare and Medicaid selected out more vulnerable 
populations for public insurance. This cabining out of more vulnerable populations is in direct 
contrast with European models based on solidarity, where the healthy and wealthy cross-
subsidize others in insurance pools.  
Medicare, which pays for medical care for 57 million older Americans and some people with 
disabilities, is itself a constellation of many parts and many rules. Medicare Part A pays for 
hospital benefits, and enrollment is free and automatic for all persons who contributed 
sufficient payroll taxes during their working years. Medicare Part B pays for outpatient care and 
is optional, although nearly all eligible people enroll. It is financed by general tax revenue and 
monthly premiums, which are income adjusted. Both of these parts have cost-sharing 
requirements when people use care, which leave enrollees vulnerable to potentially high out-
of-pocket spending for using medical care. For example, in 2019, Part A includes a deductible of 
$1364 per hospitalization.32 For hospital stays longer than 60 days, beneficiaries have cost 
sharing of $341 per day for days 61 to 90 and $682 per day beyond that.33 For outpatient care, 
beneficiaries pay a $185 deductible in 2019 and 20% coinsurance for most services.34 Ninety 
percent of all retirees obtain private supplemental insurance coverage, through various forms, 
to help fill in these gaps.35  
Medicaid has become the largest single insurer in the United States through a series of 
incremental expansions.36 Medicaid is funded jointly by the state governments and through 
federal “matching funds,” which are at least as much as what the states spend, and more in 
many states.37 It began as a program to cover poor people who were receiving cash welfare, 
 
30 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1395, 1396 (2012)). 
31 THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 95-96 (1970). 
32 2019 Medicare Costs, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/pubs/pdf/11579-medicare-costs.pdf (last 
visited July 30, 2019). 
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 JULIETTE CUBANSKI ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE CHARTBOOK 60 (4TH ED. 2010).  
36 Cindy Mann & Deborah Bachrach, Medicaid as Health Insurer: Evolution and Implications, Commonwealth 
Fund To The Point (July 23, 2015). 
37 Laura Snyder & Robin Rudowitz, Medicaid Financing: How Does it Work and What are the Implications?, 
Kaiser Family Foundation Issue Brief (May 20, 2015). 
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including children and their parents and the elderly, blind, and disabled. Over time, additional 
categories of people were added, including pregnant women and children in families with 
slightly higher incomes.38  
With the ACA, Medicaid eligibility was extended to all non-elderly poor and the income 
threshold was lifted up to 138% of the federal poverty level (just over $35,000 USD for a family 
of four in 2019). In a legal challenge to this provision, the Supreme Court found it 
unconstitutional, beyond Congress’s authority. The Court in a case called NFIB v. Sebelius, held 
that the conditions of the expansion, which required states to expand eligibility to this entire 
population or else lose their current federal funding, were like a “gun to the head” of the states 
and thus a coercive use of federal spending power.39 The effect of the decision in this case was 
to make the expansion optional. States could expand and, if they did, get additional federal 
matching funds, or not and maintain their current programs. As of the end of July 2019, 33 
states and Washington DC had expanded; 17 had not yet.40  Even with the decision in NFIB v. 
Sebelius, Medicaid has become an increasingly universal program for the poor, regardless of 
their welfare status, and the number one financing source for long-term care.  
The creation of Medicare and Medicaid to cover limited populations catalyzed a half-
century of efforts to fill in the gaps. The Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) was 
created in 1997 for children just above Medicaid income thresholds, Medicare Part D was 
added in 2003 to provide prescription drug benefits to elders, and most recently, the ACA 
expanded Medicaid and filled in coverage gaps in the Medicare Part D program. Now, just over 
one-third of the population has public health insurance, mostly with Medicare and Medicaid 
and a small number with military or veteran’s coverage.41  
Private financing—in the forms of employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI), individual 
health insurance, out-of-pocket payments, and charity care—fills in remaining gaps. Health 
insurance developed as an employment benefit throughout the 20th Century and has become 
deeply entrenched as such. While employers are not required to offer their employees health 
 
38 Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Rethinking Medicaid in the New Normal, 5 ST. LOUIS J. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 127, 138 (2011). 
39 NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
40 Kaiser Family Foundation, Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision as of July 27, 2018, at 
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-
affordable-care-
act/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last 
accessed August 16, 2018).  
41 Jessica C. Barnett & Edward R. Berchick, Current Population Reports, Health Insurance Coverage in the 
United States: 2016 2 (2017), at 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/p60-260.pdf 
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insurance, many do because expenditures on health benefits are excludable from taxes for both 
the employer and employee. The beneficial tax treatment means that health benefits have 
become a less expensive way to compensate employees.42 Over half of Americans have private 
health insurance,43 most of whom have ESI.44  
Without access to public insurance or ESI, people who want health insurance are left to 
seek it out on their own, directly from a private insurance company. Six to seven percent of the 
non-elderly (about 15 million people) had health insurance through this “individual-market” 
prior to the passage of the ACA.45 Historically, individual-market coverage was relatively more 
expensive than ESI, in part because administrative costs were as high as 15-20 percent of total 
costs. This cost arose in part because, before the ACA, insurers could underwrite and exclude 
people based on their health, with few legal restrictions.46 As many as three in five people who 
applied for individual health insurance before the ACA could not afford the high premium prices 
or were denied coverage, and many people remained uninsured or underinsured. 47 
2. The ACA and Blurring of Public and Private Insurance  
The lines between public health insurance and private insurance have blurred over time.48 
Public health insurance is increasingly outsourced to private insurers as administrators and 
reliant on private-market tools to attempt to control spending. As one example, programs like 
Medicaid have increasingly looked to private managed care companies to administer benefits, 
 
42 By one estimate, health insurance costs employers approximately $.65 per dollar of benefits. Jonathan 
Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 571, 574 (2008). 
43 Jessica C. Barnett & Edward R. Berchick, Current Population Reports, Health Insurance Coverage in the 
United States: 2016 2 (2017), at 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/p60-260.pdf  
44 Id.  
45 Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2009 
Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, no. 334, Sept. 2009, at 5. 
46 See, e.g., Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., The Role of the Individual Health Insurance Market and Prospects 
for Change, 23 HEALTH AFF. Nov.-Dec. 2004 at 79, 81; SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, SQUEEZED: WHY 
RISING EXPOSURE TO HEALTH CARE COSTS THREATENS THE HEALTH AND FINANCIAL WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 3-4 (2006). 
47 Michelle M. Doty et al., Failure to Protect: Why the Individual Insurance Market Is Not a Viable Option for 
Most U.S. Families, COMMONWEALTH FUND PUB. NO. 1300 at 1-3 (2009).  
48 Amy Monahan, The Interaction Between Public and Private Health Insurance in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. 
HEALTH LAW (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman, and William M. Sage, eds. 2017).  
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since permitted by law in 1997.49 In 2016, over three-quarters of the 80 million beneficiaries 
were enrolled in managed care plans.50  
Medicare reforms also have integrated private industry, in their case with the goal that 
competition would offer a means to control spending. In 1997, Congress created a new 
program in Medicare called Medicare+Choice (now Medicare Advantage), which allowed 
people to choose to get their Medicare coverage from private managed care plans. These plans 
cover the traditional benefits under Parts A and B, and sometimes also Part D drug benefits. 
They also provide supplemental coverage to fill in the out-of-pocket costs not covered by 
traditional Medicare. The theory, in establishing these plans, was that competition among 
private insurers to gain Medicare beneficiary enrollment would drive up quality and down 
costs. This theory has faced many problems in practice. For many years these plans were 
excessively overpaid. Especially in the initial years, the private plans attempted to select out 
healthier populations to maximize profit. Even without these problems, enrollees have difficulty 
differentiating among plans, and often make poor choices. 
As public insurance is shaped by private industry and market-based strategies, private 
health insurance has been increasingly regulated and, after the ACA, individual market 
coverage in particular has begun to take on qualities of social insurance. The ACA transformed 
the individual-market, regulating what coverage insurers could offer, to whom, and at what 
cost.  
Prior to the ACA, apart from a few federal laws,51 most of the regulation of health 
insurance, especially in the individual market, was reserved for the states by a federal law 
called the McCarran-Ferguson Act.52 The ACA in effect federalized much of the regulation of the 
health insurance to make individual-market coverage more affordable and meaningful. The ACA 
required insurers to take all applicants despite pre-existing conditions, a requirement known as 
“guaranteed issue.”53 It eliminated underwriting and allows premium variation based on only 
 
49 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33. 
50 CENTER FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE ENROLLMENT AND PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS 11 
(2016).  
51 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
Other examples include The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which set minimum standards for 
employee health plans, and The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, which restricted the use of 
genetic information in health underwriting. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 
88 Stat. 829 (1974); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).  
52 McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2012)).  
53 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012). 
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four factors: age, geography, family size, and tobacco use status.54 Even if an insurer devised a 
way to cherry-pick out healthier applicants, the law intended to disgorge any resulting profits 
through reinsurance and risk-adjustment arrangements.55 Policies were required to include a 
range of mandated benefits similar to those offered in most employer plans, in ten categories 
of “essential health benefits,” including preventive care without cost sharing, and were no 
longer allowed to impose annual or lifetime coverage limits on these mandated benefits.56  
Finally, the ACA’s individual mandate required that most Americans carry health insurance 
that offers “minimum essential coverage,” or else pay a penalty, which proved one of the most 
contentious parts of the law.57 Some people referred to the mandate as the linchpin of the 
individual market because it would resist adverse selection, where people would wait until they 
knew they needed medical care to buy coverage. The mandate intended to promote 
heterogeneous risk pools by requiring everyone to buy in, regardless of immediate medical 
need.  
In addition, the ACA provided subsidies to help lower-income individuals comply with this 
mandate. Anyone who earns from 100 to 400% of the federal poverty level ($12,490-$49,960  
for an individual) and does not have another adequate source of insurance, such as through an 
employer or Medicaid, is eligible for subsidized premiums. Lower-earners (100-250% of the 
federal poverty level) are also eligible for cost-sharing reductions to help them pay for the 
deductibles or other cost-sharing when they use medical care.58 The ACA established exchanges 
for the sale of the newly regulated policies where, in theory, private insurers would compete to 
offer plans to new enrollees. 
Nearly 200 pages of the ACA are devoted to the endeavor of regulating private insurance 
and, in particular, revamping the individual market into a quasi-public enterprise. The ACA left 
the majority of employer plans largely untouched, with several exceptions. The regulation that 
proved most contentious was one that all plans, including employer plans, cover contraceptive 
products and services, as part of a general requirement to cover preventive care without cost 
sharing. The law exempted houses of worship from this requirement and created an 
accommodation for religious nonprofit organizations. Other employers, including Hobby 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at § 1341-42, 42 U.S.C. § 18061-62.  
56 Id. at § 1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18022; Id. at § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (2012), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012).  
57 Id. at § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). Some people are exempted from the penalty for reasons including 
religious objection or affordability, defined as when premiums cost over eight percent of household income. Id. 
58 Id. at § 1401, 26 U.S.C. § 36B (providing for “premium tax credits”); Id. at § 1402, 42 U.S.C § 18071 
(providing for “cost-sharing reductions”).  
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Lobby—a closely held company, challenged this requirement as in violation of their religious 
freedom and prevailed in the Supreme Court.59  
 The ACA’s complex path to a simple goal of more universal coverage is unusual when 
viewed comparatively, but it offered an incremental way to pursue transformative policy goals. 
Optically, the ACA preserved preexisting private market structures and values. Practically, 
however, it bent and reshaped them to create more universal and meaningful access to health 
care in the U.S. Yet, in large part because of the multifaced regulatory efforts needed to achieve 
their goals, the ACA policies to expand insurance coverage have been vulnerable. 
3. ACA Challenges  
Even in the best case scenario, the ACA’s hoped-for gains were hard to achieve. In addition 
to the legal challenges discussed above, and numerous others, the ACA has faced a series of 
technical and political challenges in its efforts to expand access. 
For example, the initial roll out of the exchanges were an infamous disaster, with technical 
problems hampering enrollment. Even once the exchanges were running, people have 
struggled to choose health plans, often choosing plans in a way that seems contrary to their 
own interests. Others have struggled to afford plans on the exchanges, especially if they are 
receiving no or little premium subsidy support. Reinsurance and risk-adjustment payments have 
been underfunded and underpaid.60 In part because of these problems, some states have faced 
low insurer participation and some states even had regions with no participating insurers. As 
discussed above, the Supreme Court decision in NFIB v. Sebelius dealt a blow to the Medicaid 
expansion. Even under the best conditions, the ACA’s piecemeal approach to expanding 
coverage was a laborious process. 
Even worse, when the Trump Administration succeeded the Obama Administration, it 
worked to undermine the ACA’s insurance expansion efforts, revealing simultaneously the 
durability of some of its policies and its greatest fault lines as well. Following President Donald 
Trump’s election in November 2016, the Republican majority in the U.S. Congress pursued a 
wholesale repeal of the ACA. These efforts failed in part because of popular resistance, 
especially to the repeal of the Medicaid expansion, which was enabling more low-income 
people to access medical are. The one area where Congress did succeed was to repeal the 
individual mandate, as a part of tax reform, carving out one of the many interlocking pieces the 
ACA put in place to reform the individual market.  
 
59 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. ___ (2014).   
60 Timothy Jost, Risk Corridor Claims by Insurers Far Exceed Contributions, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Oct. 1, 2015), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/01/implementing-health-reform-risk-corridor-claims-by-insurers-far-
exceed-contributions/. 
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Akin to the repeal of the individual mandate by Congress, the Trump Administration has 
also been working a slow dismantling of the ACA reforms to the individual market, through a 
series of technocratic rules that will make it harder for insurers to participate in these markets 
and harder for people to afford coverage and to access care even when they have it. For 
example, the Administration has issued several rules that allow for the sale of plans with less 
comprehensive coverage than the ACA required. Although the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services claims that these plans will create more affordable coverage 
options,61 the result of these efforts will be that many people have health insurance inadequate 
to pay for the care they need. These options for “bare-bones” coverage also encourage adverse 
selection on the exchanges, where healthier people buy minimal coverage and sicker people 
stay in more comprehensive plans, whose premiums will become more expensive over time.  
Another round of administrative efforts has focused on scaling back the Medicaid 
expansion, and undermining Medicaid program enrollment altogether. The primary means for 
doing so is through the use of the Medicaid waiver program, known as Section 1115 waivers, 
which allow states to experiment with new benefits and program designs. In a letter to state 
Medicaid directors issued in January 2018, the Administration encouraged states to use Section 
1115 waivers to experiment with work and community-engagement requirements for 
beneficiaries. No previous administration would allow states to adopt these requirements, 
which are impossible for many of the vulnerable Medicaid population to meet and which create 
paperwork burdens and hurdles that result in disenrollment. In Arkansas, which started 
implementation in June 2018, 29% of the targeted population failed to meet requirements in 
the first month of implementation.62 If these programs survive legal challenges to their 
legitimacy—and they may or may not—they will winnow out the Medicaid population through 
gradual attrition.  
The Trump Administration has also taken aim at the contraceptive coverage requirement. In 
October 2017, the Administration issued new regulations that significantly expanded the 
employers who were exempted from the requirement. Newly exempted were all nonprofit and 
closely-held organizations with objections based on religious or moral beliefs and all publicly-
traded for-profit corporations with religiously-based objections. This new rule was contentious 
both because of its substance, including its arguably discriminatory effects against women 
employees and their health needs, and because it was issued without an opportunity for public 
comment, as is required under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 
 
61 Alex M. Azar, Obamacare Forgot About You. But Trump Didn’t, WALL ST. J. (August 15, 2018). 
62 Erin Brantley & Leighton Ku, A First Glance at Medicaid Work Requirements in Arkansas: More than One-
Quarter Did Not Meet Requirement, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (August 13, 2018). 
Draft in Progress 
14 
 
 
 
 
All of these actions incrementally scale back insurance coverage and will limit access to 
affordable medical care. All of these administrative actions have also been challenged in court, 
based on procedural and substantive grounds, and challengers have prevailed in early 
decisions. These new rules have been vulnerable in large part because of the Administration’s 
short-cutting procedural requirements under the APA. For example, initial rulings struck down 
the approval of work requirements in the states of Kentucky, Arkansas, and New Hampshire 
and the new contraceptive coverage rules in courts in California and Pennsylvania, all because 
the courts found they were promulgated in violation of the APA—without justification.  
It is impossible to predict where this struggle between the ACA’s efforts to expand 
insurance coverage and subsequent efforts to undermine it will pan out. What is clear is that it 
illustrates the deep disagreement in the United States about who should be guaranteed access 
to what medical care. It is also clear that the gradual chipping away at the ACA, since its 
passage, will further embed the inequity of access among Americans.  
C. Implications of Inequitable Coverage  
1. Heterogeneity of Insurance and Access 
Even as the overall number of Americans with health insurance increases, the heterogeneity 
of how people get insurance preserves meaningful differences. Being insured does not 
guarantee the same access for everyone. A number of attributes make it easier or harder for 
people with insurance to access and to afford medical care, including what type of insurance 
they have, where they live, and how much disposable income they have to pay for cost-sharing. 
It would be impossible to touch on all of the ways access differs among insured people in this 
chapter, but the below highlights a few critical aspects. 
One way that the many sources of coverage detailed above differ is in their “provider 
networks.” Insurers typically contract with a limited number of physicians, hospitals, and other 
providers to obtain discounted rates for their customers. When patients receive care from “in-
network” providers, they pay much less in out-of-pocket costs than if they receive care from 
“out-of-network” providers. As a practical matter, then, an individual’s choice of provider is 
restricted by the insurer’s network.  
In addition, as discussed in Part III below, providers and hospitals have significant discretion 
over which patients they accept for medical care, especially for non-emergency care. Some 
providers choose to accept only patients with private insurance and an increasing number of 
providers, especially those in high-demand practice areas and cities with more demand than 
supply, do not accept insurance at all, or charge retainer fees for a patient to join a practice. 
One leading national hospital, the Mayo Clinic, recently announced that it will prioritize 
Draft in Progress 
15 
 
 
 
 
privately-insured patients over those on Medicare or Medicaid.63 Others do so whether they 
make that policy explicit or not. Providers and facilities that accept public insurance are more 
likely to accept Medicare than Medicaid, since Medicare’s reimbursement rates are higher. 
Rates of provider participation are highest in employer plans, followed by ACA marketplace 
plans, and lowest in Medicaid.64 Among participating providers, availability of appointments 
was again highest for ESI and lowest for Medicaid.  
Variability in which benefits plans cover likewise can be significant and is defined in ways 
that allow more variability and less transparency than how benefits are defined in Europe. For 
example, employer plans have discretion for the most part to cover—or not cover—whatever 
benefits they would like. Although most large employers cover a wide range of services, 
employers could choose to offer a very limited set of benefits. Furthermore, even though the 
ACA set a baseline by requiring all individual-market plans to cover the ten categories of 
essential health benefits, it gave states considerable discretion in deciding what exactly would 
fall into these categories. Furthermore, it did not require employer plans to cover these 
benefits. Even though most do, they are not legally required to do so. 
Plans also vary on what kind of legal recourse is available when medical claims are denied. 
Although ESI is superior to other coverage in many way, beneficiaries have limited legal 
recourse and remedies when medical claims are denied by health plans. These plans, and the 
remedies for violations of plan terms, are governed by a federal law called the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The Supreme Court has interpreted this law to 
shield health insurers from liability under state law for denials of coverage under employer 
plans.65 If members of an employer plan have their claims denied, their only recourse is to pay 
for the medical care denied and seek reimbursement through federal court under the terms of 
ERISA’s remedy provisions. If they are physically harmed by the plan’s denial of care, there is no 
legal remedy for this harm. For non-employer plans, such as Medicaid plans or ACA exchange 
plans, beneficiaries still have access to state courts for coverage denials and a fuller range of 
remedies. 
Finally, someone’s resources—financial and intellectual—can have a significant impact on 
their access to medical care. Can they afford to pay the cost-sharing under their plans? Can they 
navigate the complexity of the system and their insurance plans? Can they take time off work to 
 
63 Casey Ross & Andrew Joseph, Mayo Clinic: Privately Insured Patients to Get Priority over Medicaid, Medicare 
Patients, STAT (March 15, 2017).  
64 Daniel Polsky et al., Scope of Primary Care Physicians’ Participation in the Health Insurance Marketplaces, 37 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1252 (2018). 
65 Aetna v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).  
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get to doctors and other appointments, especially if their plans have a more restricted network 
that requires them to travel farther for care? 
The multifaceted approach to health care financing in the United States not only creates 
inequitable results, it also undermines solidarity, confuses patients, and creates tremendous 
overhead costs and burdens for providers. It obscures inequities in the system, perhaps 
intentionally. This structure has been built through incremental attempts to move toward more 
universal coverage, but the end result still leaves significant gaps, both in who is covered and in 
how meaningfully the coverage provides access to care.  
2. The Future of Health Insurance in the United States 
This fragmented system is a result of various factors that will continue to hamper efforts at 
creating a more uniform structure for financing care in the United States. That said, the 
shortcomings of the ACA and its belabored efforts to build out private insurance, followed by 
efforts to dismantle ACA, could create opportunities. As the ACA health insurance exchanges 
falter, politicians, policy experts, and pundits are increasingly looking toward solutions that 
would expand public health insurance and move the United States financing system closer to its 
European counterparts.  
These ideas build on the existing Medicaid and Medicare programs, extending public health 
insurance to more people. One popular idea is a Medicaid buy-in to replace the ACA 
marketplaces. Since most states have well-established Medicaid programs and some have had 
trouble ensuring sufficient options in their exchanges, Medicaid buy-in could ensure access to 
more affordable options for exchange enrollees.  
Other proposals build on the existing Medicare program, either allowing buy-in by younger 
populations or, more transformatively, creating a Medicare-for-All program, which many 
progressive candidates running for office, including U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders, have taken up as 
their mantle. These types of expansion of public insurance will continue to meet significant 
resistance by insurers and hospitals, whose livelihood could be threatened by them. And they 
are certainly not a silver bullet. These programs have their own problems that would become 
even more detrimental if they expand. And efforts to finance them through new tax revenue 
will inevitably be highly unpopular. Yet, it is possible that the light that the ACA has shone on 
problems in health care access in the U.S. and the difficulty in remedying them through private 
market reforms that require constant technocratic tinkering, may shift the political balance.  
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III. THE TREATMENT RELATIONSHIP 
Of course, more than the financing structure affects access to health care. Both medical 
practices and legal requirements can expand or contract access to care. This Part discusses the 
legal obligations that have developed through common and statutory law that provide access 
to care under certain conditions. It focuses in particular on the doctor-patient relationship, 
specifically, the legal rules that govern the structure of the treatment relationship:  the duty to 
treat, and the formation, modification and termination of the relationship.66     
A. Constitutional Rights of Access 
Unlike in many other countries, in the U.S. there is no constitutional obligation for 
government to fund or provide health care.  The Supreme Court has firmly stated that "the 
Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay ... any of the medical expenses of 
indigents."67  This is because the Due Process Clause traditionally has been seen as protecting 
individuals from improper government interference (“negative” liberties), rather than 
generating entitlements to state-conferred assistance or benefits (“positive” liberties).68   
Nevertheless, violations of negative liberties can be argued in many contexts of health care 
regulation.  One court found a generalized constitutional right to be free of poorly justified 
state restrictions on medical decisionmaking.69  The court struck down a law that allowed only 
licensed physicians to practice acupuncture as an infringement of patients’ right to “obtain or 
reject medical treatment,” which the court found was encompassed by the right to privacy 
identified in Roe v. Wade.  Most courts, however, require only a “rational” justification for such 
restrictions,70 and, in any case, they view the state’s concern to protect health as a 
“compelling” interest,71 so these types of argument rarely succeed.  For instance, courts have 
upheld state bans on alternative cancer therapies that are probably harmless but thought to be 
 
66 This portion of the chapter is based on materials previously published as Mark A. Hall, et al., Health Care 
Law and Ethics in a Nutshell (3rd ed. 2011). 
67 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977).   
68 See also Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 1989 (echoing the 
foregoing).   
69 Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F.Supp. 1038 (S.D.Tex.1980). 
70 That is, as long as there is a conceivable justification for the policy, it is permitted. 
71 Even for fundamental rights, the state can override the right in order to promote a very important public 
interest. 
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ineffective.72   And, the FDA may restrict patients’ access to unapproved drugs, even if they are 
a dying patient’s only hope.73   
Even though there is no general constitutional right to health care, "when a State does 
decide to alleviate some of the hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner in 
which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limitations" imposed by the Due -Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution.74  Thus, a publicly-funded hospital cannot 
arbitrarily discriminate in the patients it treats or in the services it provides.75   
B. Common Law and Statutory Duties to Treat Patients   
Although U.S. health care law is a largely “constitution-free zone,” common law and 
statutory law have a great deal to say about patient’s rights to be treated.  A patient's right to 
receive treatment differs between paying and indigent patients.  Paying patients, of course, 
have greater access.  But certain obligations to treat are independent of the ability to pay, and 
for paying patients there remain some barriers based on race, disability and other factors.  
Thus, the ability to pay is not the primary issue in the following discussion.  Nevertheless, access 
to medical care by the indigent is the subject of both explicit and implied attention in much of 
what follows.  
1. Doctors 
a. The "No-Duty" Rule 
A doctor is generally under no duty to accept patients, regardless of the seriousness of their 
condition, their ability to pay, or the physician's basis for refusing.  In the seminal decision, 
Hurley v. Eddingfield, which is still regarded as stating "good" (i.e., prevailing) law, the court 
affirmed the dismissal of a suit for damages on behalf of a would-be patient who died when a 
physician refused to treat her -- notwithstanding that the doctor had been her family physician 
in the past, was available to render care (and aware that other physicians were not), was told 
she was now seriously ill and relying on an expectation of treatment, gave no reason for the 
refusal, and was offered payment.76  The court reasoned that a physician’s traditional freedom 
 
72 Cf. Rutherford v. United States, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).   
73 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(en banc). 
74 Maher, supra, 432 U.S. at 470.   
75 .  See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (unconstitutional to refuse county health 
services to temporary residents) 
76 Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901).   
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to select patients remained unaltered by the advent of state licensure law, which imposed no 
obligation on a physician “to practice at all or on other terms than he may choose to accept.”    
This “no-duty” rule tracks the historical absence, in American tort law, of any legal 
obligation to aid strangers in distress.  Professional medical ethics reflect a similar policy: "Even 
the Hippocratic Oath, by which every doctor is morally bound, assumes a pre-existing 
relationship of patient and physician, which relationship in its inception is basically contractual 
and wholly voluntary,"77 and the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics leave a physician free “to 
choose whom to serve” (though they recognize an exception for emergencies).   
Implicit in these articulations of the “no duty” rule is the axiom that, where a 
physician/patient (or hospital/patient) relationship does exist, there is a legal obligation to 
treat.  This duty to treat is fiduciary in nature (sec. B.1.) and persists until the relationship is 
properly terminated (sec. A.6).  Since the formation of the treatment relationship is 
foundational to the entire range of issues that make up law and medicine (including 
malpractice and most of bioethics), what constitutes "formation" is important.   
b. Formation of the Treatment Relationship.   
The court in Hurley v. Eddingfield, supra, absolved Dr. Eddingfield despite his having been 
the deceased's "family doctor" and the fact that the medical condition was active labor. This 
reflects the general rule that an established custom of past treatment does not oblige a doctor 
to treat a patient’s future illnesses; doctor/patient relationships are specific to a “spell of 
illness” and must be established, or renewed, accordingly.  
Within a given “spell,” however, the law often requires very slight involvement before 
finding that a treatment relationship between patient and doctor (or hospital) has been 
formed.  A patient’s description of symptoms over the phone followed by a physician’s brief 
instructions, a telephone call to a physician’s office for the purpose of initiating treatment, or 
scheduling an appointment to treat a particular medical problem have all sufficed to support a 
fact-finder’s inference that a doctor or hospital had undertaken to provide care.  While little is 
generally required, the decisions are not uniform:  courts have also found that no relationship 
arose where the call to a physician's office to schedule an appointment did not itself seek or 
generate medical advice, and that where a patient interpreted the physician’s response to her 
telephone contact as a refusal to undertake care, the requisite “consensual” characteristic of 
the relationship was missing -- irrespective of the objective content of their communication. 
Physicians' informal "curbside" consultations with colleagues normally will not establish a 
relationship between the patient and the consultee-physician.  Courts fear that implying a 
treatment relationship out of limited, routine consultative contacts (of which the patient, 
 
77 Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d 118, 123 (Cal.App.1959), 
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incidentally, is often unaware) would chill a useful medical practice, to the detriment of 
patients and physicians alike. Of course, more formal physician referrals likely will result in legal 
recognition of the treatment relationship. 
Finally, no treatment relationship customarily arises where physicians examine patients for 
the benefit of third parties.  Thus, physicians conducting physical exams for insurance eligibility 
or for employment-related purposes generally are not held liable to the examinee for failure to 
treat, or for other medical errors or nondisclosures.   
Exceptions have arisen, however.  In the employment context, courts have implied a limited 
relationship, imposing a duty that extends only to disclosure of any test results that “pose an 
imminent danger to the examinee’s physical or mental well-being,” or have implied the 
relationship where the physician affirmatively undertook treatment or gave advice.  At least 
one case held that an employer itself (in contrast to the examining physician) may be liable to 
the examinee for negligent failure to disclose a serious medical problem discovered in a pre-
employment exam.78  In contrast, another case found that a life insurer has no duty to disclose 
positive HIV test results to a policy applicant.79  However, the court, seemingly unaware of the 
"no duty" rule usually applied in such situations, suggested in dictum that if a physician (rather 
than the company) had been “directly involved,” the court might find a duty to disclose such 
information, based on patients' expectations, professional ethics, and physician expertise in 
health matters.  Of course, to the extent these policy rationales are persuasive, they undercut 
the no-duty rule that normally applies in these cases. 
2. Hospitals 
It is sometimes stated that the "no duty" rule documented above for physicians applies with 
equal force to hospitals.  While this might have been true at one time (the older case law seems 
to say so, but it is not without ambiguity), this general "no duty" rule unquestionably is not the 
law now.  Hospitals and other health care institutions, in contrast with physicians, operate 
under numerous sources of law (both statutory and court created) that prohibit the arbitrary 
refusal to admit patients. 
As noted above, uninsured patients traditionally have relied on free care rendered by public 
or private hospitals.  Most larger cities maintain a municipal hospital that is obliged to treat all 
patients regardless of the ability to pay, and many smaller localities historically provided for the 
uninsured by compensating private hospitals for treating the poor.  This local largesse has 
become overtaxed, however, and so many municipalities have greatly scaled back or eliminated 
their support for medically indigent residents.  Private hospitals have a long tradition of caring 
 
78 Dornak v. Lafayette General Hospital, 399 So.2d 168 (La. 1981).   
79 Deramus v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996).   
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for the poor, but their capacity for charity care has been stretched thin by reimbursement 
constraints that eliminate the ample revenues previously received from insured patients.   
As a consequence of these various social forces, some private hospitals turned desperately 
ill patients away from their emergency rooms, usually by transferring them to public municipal 
facilities.  This practice of "patient dumping" led both to litigation over a private hospital's 
obligation to render emergency care to indigent patients and to a federal law addressing the 
practice (sec. A.2.b.).  Because of this history and the persistence of access disparities, the 
following two subsections, while exploring hospital treatment duties generally, have particular 
importance for access to care by the indigent. 
a. The General Duty to Provide Care 
Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove80 is the seminal decision that finds in the common 
law a duty on the part of hospitals to act reasonably in their patient selection decisions.  
Manlove involved a hospital emergency room that refused to treat a severely ill infant because 
he was under the care of another physician who was not a member of the hospital's medical 
staff.  As a result, the infant died.  By analogy to the tort of negligent termination of gratuitous 
services, the court reasoned that in cases of "unmistakable emergency," a hospital that 
maintains an emergency room which by “established custom” has been open can properly be 
held responsible for refusing to treat a patient whose condition “worsens” as a consequence of 
time lost pursuing the unforthcoming treatment.  Detrimental reliance is thus at the core of the 
case.  Accordingly, Manlove applies only to emergency care, and even then its scope is rather 
limited.  (Section A.2.b.1, infra).   
A potentially more powerful and sweeping common law theory -- one that would cover all 
forms of hospital treatment -- asserts that private hospitals owe duties to the public at large on 
the ground that they are "quasi-public," by virtue of the importance of their services, the 
funding they receive from public sources, their licensure, and their tendency to enjoy monopoly 
status in a community.  The Manlove court rejected this view, however, and it has not in fact 
been widely adopted, although a few courts have been receptive to it.81   
 
b. Access to Emergency Care 
Notwithstanding the absence of a general duty to rescue, in certain areas U.S. law has been 
slowly (perhaps even ambivalently) but perceptibly responsive to the moral challenge of taking 
 
80 174 A.2d 135 (Del.1961) 
81 See, e.g., Leach v. Drummond Med. Group, 192 Cal.Rptr. 650 (Cal.App.1983) (reasoning applied to the only 
physician group practice in town). 
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action to reduce acute, visible and avoidable suffering.  One of the areas in which this trend 
may be at work is in the legal recognition of a hospital duty to care for emergency patients 
irrespective of their ability to pay.   
i. Common Law and Statutory Rights 
Manlove was the first case to fashion a theory of relief for patients denied hospital 
emergency care.  Its principal impact has been in securing access to emergency care by 
uninsured patients.  In addition, many states have laws expressly requiring hospitals to treat 
emergency patients without regard to their ability to pay.  Federal law imposes the same duty 
on hospitals that maintain charitable tax exemption.   
These established legal protections are limited, though, by their narrow definitions of what 
constitutes an emergency and of the extent of treatment required in an emergency.  For 
instance, the Manlove theory, applied in a number of states, addresses refusals to treat only in 
cases of "unmistakable" emergency, only where the patient's condition worsens due to the 
delay in finding an alternative source of care, and only where the delay is caused by reliance on 
an ER's open-door custom.  Many of the state statutes define an emergency as a situation 
requiring immediate treatment in order to prevent loss of life or limb -- which can exclude a 
broad range of serious, albeit less extreme, medical conditions.  
Two Arizona cases point the way toward a more expansive duty to provide emergency care.  
Eschewing Manlove's reliance-based approach, the Arizona Supreme Court has implied a 
sweeping duty "to provide emergency care to all persons presenting themselves for such aid" 
(emph. in original), ostensibly based upon the state regulatory requirement that all general 
hospitals maintain emergency facilities as a condition of licensure.82  A decade later the court 
relied on private hospital accreditation standards that prohibit discrimination based on the 
"source of payment," incorporated by reference into the state's hospital licensing statute, to 
conclude that hospitals may never transfer emergency patients on economic grounds.83   
These two Arizona cases are important for two reasons.  First, they are best understood as 
based in common law public policy -- essentially, an emergency room application of the "quasi-
public status" theory discussed above -- rather than on idiosyncrasies of state regulatory law, 
and are thus of general rather than parochial interest.  Second, they allow courts to redefine 
the nature of an emergency and the extent of the treatment required.  Hospitals are obliged to 
treat any patient with a "need for immediate attention" and to provide such patients all care 
that is "medically indicated."  The duty to treat thus encompasses far more than care necessary 
to prevent the patient's condition from deteriorating:  "The relevant inquir[y] ... d[oes] not 
 
82 Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hospital, 537 P.2d 1329 (Ariz.1975).   
83 Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital, 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz.1984). 
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relate to 'stabilization' and 'transferability,' but rather to the nature and duration of the 
emergency."84  This broadened theory has not been adopted by other states, perhaps due to 
the subsequent federal enactment of, and widespread reliance on, the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) -- notwithstanding EMTALA's own arguable 
limitations in this connection. 
ii. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act 
The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1985 (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. 
1395dd, has become the single most important legal tool governing access to emergency care, 
due principally to its uniform national applicability and its remedies.  Hospitals that receive 
Medicare payment must comply with EMTALA's terms for all their patients.  EMTALA creates a 
private right of action for damages for violation of its terms by such hospitals, though there is 
no comparable action against physicians.  It also authorizes civil money penalties up to $50,000 
for negligent noncompliance by both hospitals and physicians. 
EMTALA was enacted in the belief that state law was too weak to prevent the widespread 
“dumping” of indigent and uninsured patients.  Its protections, however, go further: they are 
triggered by the refusal to properly examine or treat “any individual” who comes to a hospital 
emergency department seeking care, irrespective of whether the patient can pay for care or the 
hospital’s reasons for refusing care.  EMTALA requires, first, that the hospital provide for an 
“appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital’s emergency 
department,” to determine whether there is a medical emergency.  If so, treatment must then 
be provided to the point of “stabilization.”  Specific analogous provisions also apply to women 
in labor. 
1. Screening  
A moment’s reflection on the statutory language just quoted suggests that a diagnostic 
screening might be "[in]appropriate" in varying ways, and for different reasons. Uncertainty has 
thus arisen over just what hospital conduct the statutory phrase reaches, as well as what 
standard of performance it imposes.  Initially, there was debate over whether EMTALA requires 
or assumes an improper motive for refusing treatment, based on factors such as economics, 
demographics, or personal characteristics.  This has been criticized on the grounds that there is 
no statutory support for such a reading, that it is so inclusive as to be virtually without limit 
(and therefore meaning), and that it is nonetheless sufficiently difficult to prove that it would 
 
84 688 P.2d at 611.   
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defeat virtually all EMTALA claims.  In Roberts v. Galen of Virginia,85 the Supreme Court put this 
issue to rest, holding that EMTALA’s stabilization requirement (and probably also its screening 
requirement) applies regardless of motive.  
Instead of a subjective motivation test, many courts have applied a more objective test that 
looks to whether the patient was harmed by “disparate” or “non-uniform” treatment – some 
purposeful variation from the medical practices that the hospital would otherwise apply to 
similarly-situated persons.  This approach focuses solely on whether a hospital complied with its 
own standard procedures, and not whether those practices are themselves reasonable.  For 
instance, a hospital that failed to do an expensive diagnostic test on a patient with chest pains 
or a headache would not be liable under EMTALA for an undetected heart attack or brain 
aneurysm simply because other hospitals would have done the test; instead, a challenger would 
need to show that this particular hospital normally handled cases like this differently.  Courts 
have adopted this “disparate treatment” analysis largely in an effort to avoid making EMTALA a 
federal malpractice law that would displace ordinary state-law negligence claims, a result which 
they believe Congress did not intend.86   
2. Treatment and Stabilization. 
If the required screening reveals an "emergency medical condition," the hospital must 
undertake treatment.  EMTALA’s definition of “emergency” is a condition reasonably likely, 
without “immediate” treatment, to create “serious jeopardy” to the person’s health.  This 
definition is at least as inclusive as many of those found in state common law and state 
statutes, and the range of conditions it covers is thus reasonably broad.  
The more problematic issue is how far treatment must proceed under the statutory 
mandate to “stabilize” the condition.  Stabilization is defined as a level of treatment likely to 
prevent “material deterioration” of the condition during transfer.  (Transfers of unstabilized 
patients are permitted in limited, specified circumstances involving a written request or 
expected medical benefit).  The facts of a pre-EMTALA case are instructive.87  An auto accident 
victim came to the emergency room of a private hospital with "multiple deep facial lacerations, 
a possible head injury, traumatic damage to the teeth and multiple bruises and contusions of 
the body, resulting in considerable loss of blood."  The hospital merely bandaged him, took X-
rays, monitored for shock and administered I.V. fluids to stabilize his blood pressure before 
transferring him to a Veteran's Administration hospital for further treatment.  This course of 
 
85 525 U.S. 249 (1999). 
86 Vickers v. Nash. General Hosp., 78 F.3d 139, 142-43 (4th Cir. 1996) (reviewing cases). 
87 Joyner v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, 230 So.2d 913 (La.App.1970). 
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action is probably entirely consistent with EMTALA; thus in many situations, EMTALA actually 
may not require more extensive care than was due under state common and statutory law.  
Ironically, the expansive treatment obligations in a few common law precedents (see the two 
Arizona cases, supra) may actually exceed the “stabilization” requirement of EMTALA.  Given 
EMTALA's dominance of the field, however, their further application seems unlikely, even 
though EMTALA does not actually preempt such common law claims.   
iii. “Preventive” Dumping. 
EMTALA requires screening and stabilization of anyone who “comes to” an emergency 
department.  Under this language courts have rejected EMTALA claims by patients who do not, 
literally, show up at the hospital.  By regulation, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
has confirmed that “comes to” requires physical presence on hospital property; however, a 
hospital’s own ambulance is deemed hospital property, and, arguably, non-hospital ambulances 
cannot be re-routed except for reasons of lack of hospital capacity or staff.   
EMTALA has not been without controversy.  Some have criticized it for responding to a 
problem that was never as widespread as claimed or that no longer exists, and for imposing an 
awkward and poorly drafted solution.  Others believe that EMTALA has been effective; still 
others that patient dumping persists at unacceptable levels, notwithstanding EMTALA.  Under 
any view, however, EMTALA has become central to the law of access to emergency medical 
care, and there is little reason to believe its role will decline.   
3. Doctors within Health Care Organizations 
How can hospitals, dependent on doctors to deliver care, comply with their institutional 
duty to treat (under the various legal theories explored above) if Hurley leaves physicians free 
to refuse patients?  One solution is regulatory:  since EMTALA was enacted, physicians are no 
longer completely free to refuse emergency patients with impunity, because they may face civil 
fines for negligent noncompliance with EMTALA's terms.  A second solution (pre-EMTALA) is 
contractual.  Hospitals may require as a condition of medical staff membership that physicians 
assist in treating emergency and indigent patients.  If physicians accept this condition by joining 
the medical staff or working in the emergency room, then this contractual obligation may 
extend to the patient as a third-party beneficiary.88   
A similar solution applies to managed care, where a health plan may contractually bind 
participating physicians to see individuals it has a contractual duty to treat.  In Hand v. Tavera,89  
 
88 Hiser v. Randolph, 617 P.2d 774 (Ariz.1980). 
89 864 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App. 1993). 
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the court relied on the applicable contracts (characteristic of health plans) to find a treatment 
relationship with the plan’s on-call physician.  The physician refused to authorize the patient's 
admission to the plan’s hospital based on the symptoms and history conveyed by a telephone 
consult from the ER.  As a consequence, the patient had a stroke at home.  The court reasoned 
that the enrollee paid premiums to the plan to purchase medical care in advance of need; the 
plan arranged to meet its obligation to provide care by paying physicians; those physicians, in 
return, agreed to treat the plan’s members.  The identity of the physician who happened to be 
on call for emergency admissions was immaterial: the plan brought the patient and physician 
together “just as surely as though they had met directly and entered the physician-patient 
relationship.”90     
C. Wrongful Denials: Antidiscrimination Law and Refusal to Treat 
As discussed thus far, physicians (and, to a considerably lesser extent, hospitals) enjoy 
substantial legal discretion to refuse patients for "good" reasons, "bad" reasons, or no stated 
reason at all.  In a limited number of areas, which are the subject of this section, federal law 
specifically disapproves certain bases for treatment refusals.  In addition, states often have 
counterpart regulatory laws, generally applicable to “public accommodations” (which covers 
hospitals but often not medical offices).  Private accreditation standards also prohibit 
discriminatory practices by hospitals on the basis of race and other characteristics, including 
source of payment, and the federal charitable tax exemption for hospitals carries with it certain 
obligations to provide care on a nondiscriminatory basis to paying patients.   
1. Title VI:  Race, Ethnicity, and Gender.   
Title VI of the federal civil rights law, enacted in 1964, prohibits any “program or activity 
receiving federal financial assistance” from discriminating against, excluding, or denying 
benefits to individuals on the grounds of race, color, or national origin.91 Thus, overt 
discrimination by hospitals participating in the federal Medicare or Medicaid programs (which 
were enacted in 1965) or receiving other financial support is barred.  Despite Title VI, subtler 
forms of racial (as well as gender) discrimination by health care providers doubtless persist.  For 
instance, Title VI has been invoked in a few cases challenging decisions to relocate or to close 
hospitals serving predominantly minority populations.   
Until 2010, however, there was no clear prohibition of discrimination that applied to 
physicians.  That is because, prior to the Affordable Care Act, courts and regulators interpreted 
Title VI as not applying to physicians at all.  (Even though physicians receive federal funds 
 
90 864 S.W.2d at 679. 
91 42 U.S.C. 2000d. 
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through Medicare and Medicaid, courts and regulators interpreted those programs in a strained 
way that avoided triggering Title VI.)  The ACA changed this legal landscape by broadening the 
definition of federally funded activities to include funding of physician services, and also by 
extending the prohibition to discrimination based on gender.   
2. Disability Discrimination 
Two closely related laws, both of which apply to a wide range of activities beyond health 
care, have become important in this field:  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 
U.S.C. 794), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 USC 12101).  HIV/AIDS first 
drew attention to the application of disability law to health care, and HIV cases continue to 
arise and receive coverage, but the application of disability discrimination law to health care is 
considerably broader. 
The most obvious difference between the two laws is the reach of their regulation.  Section 
504 applies to federally funded “programs and activities” (which includes hospitals that receive 
Medicare reimbursement, but probably not doctors).  The ADA, by contrast, reaches various 
entities irrespective of whether they receive federal financial assistance, including state and 
local governments (Title II) and public accommodations (Title III).  Of greatest importance here, 
the latter include the “professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service 
establishment,” so doctors' offices are covered.  While there is more case law developed under 
sec. 504 because it has been in effect for so much longer, the greater reach of the ADA suggests 
that it will ultimately supersede section 504 in importance. 
a. Protected Class. 
The first question in most disability discrimination cases is whether the individual falls 
within the protected class.  Section 504 protects a “handicapped individual,” defined as 
someone with a “physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 
person’s major life activities,” or someone with either a “record of,” or who is “regarded as 
having,” such an impairment.  The ADA’s definition of “disability,” except for the choice of the 
operative word, is almost verbatim.92   
These terms are quite broad, reflecting Congress’ intent to protect people against 
discrimination arising not only from prejudice but also from fear and myth.93  Echoing those 
policies, the Supreme Court held that non-symptomatic HIV infection constitutes a disability 
under the ADA.  In Bragdon v. Abbott,94 an HIV-positive patient alleged that her dentist violated 
 
92 42 U.S.C. 12102(2). 
93 School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279, 284 (1987).   
94 524 U.S. 624 (1998) 
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the ADA when he refused to fill a cavity for her in his office (offering, instead, to do so at a 
hospital, though there was no evidence the hospital would be safer or even that he had 
privileges to practice there).  The Court held that non-symptomatic HIV infection constitutes (in 
the statutory terms) a “physical impairment” from the moment of infection onward, and that, 
by interfering with the plaintiff’s reproductive capacity, the infection “affected a major life 
activity” because of the centrality to life of reproduction and sexual relations.  The open-ended 
nature of this “major life activity” category is suggested by the Court’s intimation that other 
plaintiffs might persuasively assert that HIV impacts other life activities, as well.  Finally, the 
Court concluded that HIV infection was a “substantial limit” on the plaintiff’s reproductive 
activity, noting that her status would impose significant risks of infection on male sexual 
partners (20-25%), and on any child during gestation and childbirth (8-25%).  The Court 
emphasized that this third requirement is met “even if the difficulties [generated by the 
disability for the life activity in question] are not insurmountable.” 
 
b. Core Provisions  
Finding a handicap or disability is only the first inquiry.  Section 504 prohibits regulated 
programs or activities from excluding, denying benefits to, or discriminating against any 
“otherwise qualified handicapped individual...solely by reason of his handicap.”  29 U.S.C. 794.  
“Otherwise qualified” means able to meet program requirements “in spite of” the handicap, as 
established through an individualized, factually-specific inquiry.  So, for example, a quadriplegic 
would not be otherwise qualified to work on construction sites but would be otherwise 
qualified to work at desk jobs. Even where people cannot initially meet all program or activity 
requirements, they may nonetheless be “otherwise qualified” if the sponsor of the program or 
activity can make “reasonable accommodation”-- i.e., take steps, short of incurring “undue 
financial and administrative burdens” or making “a fundamental alteration in the nature of the 
program” (Arline, supra), that would enable the person to meet the requirements, in which 
case the sponsor must do so.  The ADA rules, though not identical, are similar.   
A key difficulty in disability law is determining whether a person is "otherwise qualified" for 
the benefit or service.  Classical applications of this standard arise in cases involving access to 
education and  employment, in which the analysis has two salient characteristics:   (1) it 
impliedly assumes that the benefit or service is generally available to a qualified class of people, 
under eligibility requirements established by its sponsor; and (2) because the disability is not 
the reason for which the person seeks the benefit or service, it is coherent to ask whether the 
person can meet the eligibility terms notwithstanding (or "in spite of") the disability, with any 
needed reasonable  accommodation.  
In health care, this analysis applies logically enough where an individual is seeking access to 
care for a problem that is unrelated to his disability, as where a physician who is treating a 
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patient for an ear infection refuses to perform medically indicated surgery after learning that 
the patient is HIV positive.  The benefit (ear surgery) is generally available on certain terms to 
those who need it; and, since the patient is seeking care for a condition other than the disability 
(HIV status), it is coherent to ask whether, with reasonable accommodation (here, relating to 
the patient’s infectiousness and  immunocompromise), the patient qualifies for the benefit "in 
spite of" that disability. 
But in cases in which it is precisely the disability that gives rise to the need for access to 
health care, this is not a very coherent approach to “otherwise qualified.” A major case in this 
regard arose when a hospital wanted to deny artificial ventilation to an infant with anencephaly 
whose respiratory distress was a result of the anencephaly. With some struggle, a few courts 
have found a meaningful approach in these cases.  They preclude a health care provider from 
using disability alone as the basis for withholding medical benefits.  A person is “otherwise 
qualified” for a particular medical benefit if “there is no factor apart from the mere existence of 
disability that renders the participant unqualified for the benefit.”95 To withhold care, the 
provider would need to have a “bona fide medical reason” for the denial.  This would allow a 
physician to refuse care based on the claim that the physicians felt under-qualified to treat the 
patient’s particular condition. Or if the patient’s condition would preclude a successful outcome 
from treatment, as with a kidney transplant in a patient with lung cancer, care could be denied 
on account of the condition.      
D. Modifying the Terms of the Treatment Relationship 
Although the formation of the treatment relationship is essentially contractual in nature, 
once established, tort and fiduciary law generally govern the parties’ conduct and their mutual 
obligations, through doctrines such as medical malpractice and informed consent.  This section 
explores the extent to which patients and physicians are free to modify those rules and define 
the terms of their relationship in accordance with their own preferences. 
Courts have generally refused to enforce agreements with patients by which health care 
providers try to waive their liability for negligence.  The leading case is Tunkl v. Regents of the 
University of California,96 in which the California Supreme Court concluded that a hospital's 
exculpatory agreement with a patient, signed at admission, bore all the indicia of an 
unconscionable adhesion contract.  
Tunkl and similar cases do not, by their terms, preclude liability waivers that fall short of full 
exculpation, and in fact courts are likely to enforce releases from liability where the care 
 
95 Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381, 1389-90 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (seeking care for, and alleging discrimination 
based on, HIV status).   
96 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). 
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provided departs from standard medical practice for good reason, as when a patient leaves the 
hospital early against medical advice, or refuses recommended medical treatment.  In this 
connection, consider Shorter v. Drury,97 holding that a document signed by a Jehovah's Witness 
surgical patient, releasing providers from responsibility for consequences "due to my refusal to 
permit the use of blood," constituted an enforceable assumption of the risk of an otherwise-
avoidable death by the patient, rather than an unenforceable exculpation of negligence for the 
physician.   
Courts have also responded favorably to agreements changing the forum or mechanism of 
dispute resolution.  For example, HMOs may require their members to arbitrate rather than 
litigate medical negligence claims, at least where this is agreed to through bargaining by a 
powerful representative (a large employer) and there is a choice of alternative plans.98  On the 
other hand, “point of treatment” arbitration agreements, presented for signature upon hospital 
admission or at the doctor’s office, are less likely to receive judicial approval because of 
concerns about their fairness, though these decisions too are not uniform.   
Agreements to alter the prevailing standard of care, rather than to waive it entirely as in 
Tunkl, are more difficult.  If notice is adequate and there is some choice, should HMOs (for 
example) be allowed to contractually bind enrollees to accept a lower-than-normal standard of 
care (e.g., anything above “gross negligence”) by plan providers, as a cost-containment 
mechanism that would benefit enrollees by reducing premiums?  The law on such questions is 
not well-developed, but is likely to be a focal point of controversy as medical standards are 
increasingly subsumed within managed care contractual arrangements.99   
E. Terminating the Treatment Relationship  
Professional duties arise upon the formation of a treatment relationship and continue until 
it is properly terminated.  Patient "abandonment" is the term applied to an improper 
termination of treatment that is intentional, in contrast with termination that is due to a 
mistake in medical judgment.  The latter is a matter for ordinary malpractice law, but this 
distinction is frequently confused. 
Where a treatment relationship exists, the law of abandonment requires that the physician 
(or hospital) provide all necessary care unless the relationship is terminated (1) by the patient 
or (2) by the provider, after giving the patient proper notice and an opportunity to secure an 
 
97 695 P.2d 116 (Wash. 1985). 
98 Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976).   
99 For competing arguments, see Clark Havighurst, Health Care Choices: Private Contracts as Instruments of 
Health Reform (1996) (endorsing such a contractarian approach); Maxwell Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: 
Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 365 (1990) (criticizing it). 
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alternate source of care.  Abandonment law is thus much more forgiving than is usually 
recognized.  The only explicit restraint on a doctor's (or hospital's) freedom to abandon a 
patient is the procedural one of notice.  As classically conceived, there is no real substantive 
content to abandonment law because the law does not scrutinize the reasons for 
abandonment:  so far as abandonment law is concerned, doctors may, with proper notice, stop 
treatment because they want to retire, or go on vacation, or simply because they dislike the 
patient. 
To ensure that there is no question about the adequacy of notice to the patient and 
opportunity to obtain substitute care, prudent physicians as a practice usually take affirmative 
steps themselves to arrange for substitute care.  Vacationing doctors will usually have  
associates cover their cases and retiring doctors will ordinarily tell patients that a designated 
physician has agreed to take their cases.  Prudent hospitals, likewise, will never simply 
discharge an ill patient, even after ample notice; instead, they will locate an alternative facility 
to which a patient can be transferred. 
These pragmatic accommodations have created a degree of uncertainty in abandonment 
law.  Because this body of law is based on an implied contractual undertaking and on notions of 
fiduciary responsibility, its precise limits are not firmly set.  Consequently, the case law in 
different states offers conflicting indications of whether simple notice of treatment termination 
is sufficient, or whether instead the law requires health care providers to arrange for a 
substitute source of care.  
This point becomes a critical issue in the modern context where doctors and hospitals face 
increasingly severe constraints in health care reimbursement.  A provider might seek to 
terminate care because the patient's insurance runs out or won't cover the treatment.  If 
patients are given "notice," and perhaps appeal rights, will this suffice under the usual 
procedural requirements of abandonment doctrine -- or might a creative and sympathetic 
plaintiff persuade a court to read a substantive element into the doctrine, and prohibit the 
termination of treatment based on inability to pay?   
Three cases shed conflicting but ambiguous light on the legality of "economic 
abandonment."  In Ricks v. Budge,100 the court allowed the plaintiff to maintain an action 
alleging the following facts:  After ordering Mr. Ricks to the hospital for a seriously infected 
hand, Dr. Budge refused treatment and walked out because Mr. Ricks would not immediately 
catch up on his past due accounts.  This decision is frequently cited by commentators for the 
proposition that it is illegal to abandon a patient who cannot pay.  However, these facts do not 
support a general prohibition of economic abandonment.  Instead, the holding is perfectly 
consistent with purely "procedural" abandonment law, which only requires the doctor "to give 
 
100 64 P.2d 208 (Utah 1937). 
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the patient sufficient notice so the patient can procure other medical attention if he desires," 
id., and prohibits patient abandonment only at a critical stage in the course of treatment. 
Additional support for this view is suggested in a leading abandonment decision, Payton v. 
Weaver.101  There, the court allowed a physician to stop treating an uncooperative patient 
despite the unavailability of any substitute care.  This case concerned a renal dialysis patient 
who "frequently appear[ed] for treatment late or at unscheduled times in a drugged or 
alcoholic condition, used profane and vulgar language, and on occasion engaged in disruptive 
behavior, such as ... cursing staff members with obscenities."  Although Dr. Weaver's attempts 
to find alternative treatment centers were unsuccessful, the court held that he "gave sufficient 
notice of [his intent to cease treatment] and discharged all his obligations."  It is difficult to 
determine, though, whether Payton v. Weaver invokes a purely procedural abandonment rule 
because its compelling facts might also provide substantive justification for the decision to 
discontinue treatment. 
Finally, in Muse v. Charter Hosp. Winston-Salem,102 the court ruled that a psychiatric 
hospital illegally interfered with the physician's medical judgment when it encouraged the 
discharge of an adolescent patient whose insurance ran out, which led to the patient's suicide 
three weeks later.  Although the opinion never mentions the abandonment doctrine, it is based 
on the hospital’s alleged "policy or practice" of discharging patients when their insurance runs 
out.  Even so, the decision is subject to the same uncertainty as Ricks and Payton: we don't 
know whether the hospital is liable because the discharge policy is per se wrong or because of 
the procedure it followed failed to sufficiently notify the parents of their son's fragile condition 
so they would be sure to find alternative care.  Even with such notice, however, a patient who is 
discharged for financial reasons might be unable to find a suitable alternative source of care, 
making it difficult for the initial provider to terminate care in a legally safe manner. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
What is evident from the above discussion of access to health care in the U.S. is that there is 
no singular, coherent set of guidelines or polices that determine who has access to what and 
when. The lack of constitutional rights and of any centralized system of financing or regulating 
access has created great legal and policy complexity. Although the basic moral questions that 
inform policy and legal development are the same in the U.S. as in Europe, the U.S. deals with 
these questions on a case-by-case basis and in opaque ways that often simply avoid answering 
them altogether. The result is that the most defining characteristic of access to medical care in 
the U.S. is its inequity.  
 
101 182 Cal.Rptr. 225 (1982). 
102 452 S.E.2d 589 (N.C. App. 1995), aff'd mem., 464 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. 1995). 
